Chirot, also a sociology faculty member, became professor emeritus this spring. He has joined the editorial board of , a moderately conservative online publication that he said is responding to the growing divide by “trying to strengthen the middle.” The publication to defend liberal democracy “not in the modern American political sense, but in the sense” of ensuring equal protection under the law, basic civil liberties and respect for individual rights.

In February he published an essay on the site titled “” calling for empathy and compromise in creating a new, equitably shared American narrative. Though “the United States is not about to dissolve” like the Austro-Hungarian or Soviet empires in their 20th century times of crisis, Chirot wrote, “our deep divisions will not heal unless a new, more viable history comes to sustain national unity.”

Chirot is the author of the 2020 book “,” which he discussed with 91探花Notebook last April. Given the unprecedented events of the last year, and January 6, 2021, a follow-up conversation seemed appropriate.

In the essay you discuss the role of commonly held historical narratives and myths in the life of nations. “We no longer have a common history,” you write. “This is a root cause of American division 鈥� the historical visions of the left and right cannot be bridged because they are based on drastically different histories.” Did we ever really have a true common history?

We did have a common history that excluded African-Americans and others. At one time large numbers of new immigrants were also excluded: Irish, Chinese, Japanese, Italians and Jews. Native Americans were acknowledged only as marginal people slated for disappearance. Gradually most of these groups were absorbed into a common history that celebrated the “melting pot” theory of America. With the听civil rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s African-Americans were brought in too.

Since the 1990s, this hard-won, emerging but still incomplete consensus has collapsed. Many people had never accepted it, but they appeared to be a diminishing number of racist whites. Unfortunately the rise of a new far right fueled by religious fundamentalists, Southern whites, and an increasingly insecure white rural and working class has broken the consensus. Traditionally听conservative Republicans used the culture wars to get their tax cuts and extra privileges, but they lost control of the narrative. First Newt Gingrich and then Trump took advantage, and now we are as far from having a consensus about our history as we were in the old days. We increasingly have two entirely different stories. In one, America has always been white and blameless with others being marginal and treated pretty well. In the other, whites are guilty of centuries of prejudice and all those stories about democracy and a melting pot were lies. The more we get pulled toward either one of these versions of our history, the less likely that we will begin to heal our deep divisions.

Empathy and compromise will be needed to create “a new, more viable history” to bring forward, you write. How could such a process begin? And what might the result look like?
A well-reviewed 2015 book I wrote with made the claim that much ideology has started when leading intellectuals put forward new ideas. That was certainly the case with the 17th and 18th century Enlightenment and the consequent great changes in thinking in the 19th and 20th centuries. I still believe this. So professional intellectuals in universities and among other听public intellectuals have to do their part. My sense is that politically active university faculties are very far from having recognized this.

It is in a way far easier to take sides by emphasizing all the wrongs committed by the United States. Finding a synthesis requires much harder work. Balancing an honest appraisal of past sins and past accomplishments at the same time is an effort. There is also a growing but still small effort by some slightly right-of-center public intellectuals ( and at Stanford, for example) to do this too. The hope is that decent former moderate conservatives can break decisively with the dishonesty of the far right and somewhat moderate leftist intellectuals can join them in the project of creating a viable historical听synthesis.

A lot of “willful forgetting” goes into the making and maintaining of a nation, you write. “And a good deal of that forgetting is now being remembered.” You ask: “If so much is now being unforgotten, can the nation survive?” What were your conclusions?

As I have spelled out above, we cannot forget past wrongs, but that does not mean that we should throw out past efforts to remedy those wrongs. There is effective political mobilization to counter the most egregious efforts to suppress voting rights and police brutality. But that needs to be accompanied by a new historical synthesis that will eventually be taught in schools. This is a generational project that will take a couple of decades, at best.

With the Biden administration underway, what foreign policy and international matters do you think need the most attention, diplomacy and possibly healing?

Basically, the United States has to help restore faith in democracy by starting at home. It needs to rally its natural foreign allies and regain their trust. We have to find a way of dealing with China while avoiding war. The details are daunting. Something that is crucial and will also take time is to rebuild our demoralized diplomatic service and the many parts of our government that听participate in conducting foreign policy (for example the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, parts of Treasury, Commerce, intelligence, and of course the State Department). That goes for the even larger core of necessary experts to staff our federal government.

The Biden administration recognizes this. Unfortunately, the Trump period greatly accelerated the rot, but that had been underway for a long time before. Modern societies need effective government, and that can only work if there is a capable civil service guided by expertise.

You discuss insurrection and revolt in your 2020 book. The Jan. 6 riot made the topic all too real to Americans. What are your thoughts on the meaning of that event?听

There were two main conclusions I drew in the book. One is that when a society does not address its major problems for a long time, the potential for revolution increases. That has happened in the United States. Growing inequality, our bizarrely complex health care system, infrastructural decay, the rise in overt racism, the inability of Congress to pass laws, the lack of help for those hurt by globalization, and many other issues have accumulated. That is dangerously destabilizing.

The second conclusion I drew is that once a potentially revolutionary period arrives, all the forces at work strengthen the extremes. The middle collapses, civil war ensues, and whether the far right or far left wins, the results tend to be catastrophic. That does not always happen, but such a dire result is too common.听It can no longer be ruled out for the United States. If anyone had told me that even 10 years ago I would have laughed. After the Trump听administration听and its sorry climax on January听6, I no longer believe this is a laughing matter.

Looking forward, what causes you the most concern? And what, if anything, are you able to feel optimistic about?

The last time the United States was so divided we had a terrible civil war. We are far from that now, but much closer than just a few years ago. I think I do see some reaction against the extremes in both popular opinion and even among some business elites. I hope that we as professional academic intellectuals learn to join in the efforts to strengthen enlightened moderation.

Those who wish for revolution should be wary, a new book by warns; they might come to regret that wish should revolution become a violent reality.

Chirot is a professor in the 91探花 Jackson School of International Studies and of sociology. His latest book, “” was published in March by Princeton University Press. He is the author or co-author of many articles and several books, most recently “The Shape of the New: Four Big Ideas and How They Made the Modern World” (with Jackson School colleague , 2015).

The book, publisher’s notes say, explores “why most modern revolutions have ended in bloodshed and failure 鈥� and what lessons they hold for today’s world of growing extremism.” One reviewer said that Chirot “thinks like a scholar and writes like an engaging journalist as he looks for wisdom in history.”

Chirot answered a few questions via email about his study of revolutions and how it comments on the current world situation.

What鈥檚 the central thesis of the book 鈥� is it that early moderates in revolutionary times are often ousted by the extremists who follow?

Dan Chirot: Yes, and let me say a bit more. When economic, social, and political problems pile up without being addressed because of incompetent political leadership, revolutions become more likely, particularly if an unexpected crisis occurs.

Typically, it is moderates who begin the process of forcing change and leading revolutions, but they tend to lose control to radicals willing to go to extremes to defend the revolution against its foes.听The radicals may well start with utopian ideals, but these are impractical and are not supported听by most of their people, so if they want to stay in power they quickly turn to brutal repression. That is why the best-known revolutions in modern times have turned into tyrannies.

What revolutions, across what period of time, does the book consider?

D.C.: I started with French Revolution of 1789 because it became the main, iconic example听of a modern violent revolution. After Russia’s 1917 Bolshevik (as Lenin called his communist party) Revolution, that too became a model, though the French Revolution has remained very widely used as one that taught important lessons.

I compared the French Revolution to the American one because the latter was much less violent and has not been used very often as a leading example to be followed. Then I moved to the 20th century and used examples from the Mexican, Russian, Chinese and Iranian revolutions. I also used Hitler’s seizure of power because the Nazi program was indeed revolutionary. I also discussed the anti-colonial, “third world” revolutions, concentrating on Algeria and Angola. The most recent examples I used were the mostly peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union听that ended communism there.

You write: “In a relatively stable, well-educated society with freedom of expression and a basic faith in science, the fanatics and liars can be marginalized. But when these beneficial conditions no longer exist, and when at the same time critical problems can no longer be successfully handled, moderate reformism will no longer prevail.” This situation sounds eerily familiar; what does your study of revolutions tell you about the world’s current woes?听

D.C.: A main reason for the startling emergence of populist, mostly right-wing, anti-Enlightenment political forces in the world is that many problems brought on by globalization 鈥� the emergence听of an Internet based economy, and the decline of employment 听in what used to be good blue collar and routine white collar jobs 鈥� have not been addressed by governments.

Mounting frustration has made many turn to those who promise quick fixes. Some hope this will bring about left-wing, or more socialist revolutions, but so far it is mostly the ultra-nationalist, ethnocentric, anti-scientific, even antidemocratic far-right that听has gained traction all around the world. There have听not been violent revolutions, but as these problems and rising inequality frustrate populations ever more, there will be.

The current pandemic and resulting economic depression will accelerate discontent, thus increasing the probability in many places, including countries so far considered stable, but even more in poorer ones, that there will be revolutionary violence.

“Great Britain industrialized, went through drastic social change, and democratized in the 19^th to mid 20^th century without a revolution,” you write. How was that accomplished, and are there lessons there?

D.C.: There were of course other countries that industrialized without having听violent revolutions. The United States after the Civil War is an example, and so were some European countries, including Germany.

Good governance, capable administrators, making timely reforms, and allowing those frustrated to have some voice all make violent demands for change less likely. Stubborn autocracy led by incompetents like the Shah of Iran or Tsar Nicholas II of Russia shut off moderate opposition, fail to see that change is necessary, and thus eventually provoke violent upheaval.

The same holds for out-of-touch political and economic elites in general. Great Britain gradually expanded the proportion of the population that could vote, allowed a moderate socialist party to grow, and thus provided room for protest and change. It failed to do this in its colonies, including in Ireland, and in those places revolutions did break out.

Other European democracies with colonies, most prominently France and the Netherlands, tried to hold on to their colonies after World War II and wound up fighting bitter, senseless wars to stop independence听movements. That led to the rise of more radical revolutionary independence movements. This was听a disaster for听everyone.听

What of North Korea? You write that the country has failed to create the utopia it promised its people but is “a brilliant success in having survived in a difficult international environment.” Could revolution come there?

D.C.: If you keep a well-armed elite sufficiently satisfied it can prevent a revolution. The French Revolution actually began because the aristocracy was increasingly听opposed to the monarchy. North Korea pampers its elite. It also allows considerable black market activity to keep the economy going. The top military brass remains loyal. At the same time the elite knows that if the system collapses, they are finished.

One day that will change, but not immediately. That is why autocrats need to constantly raise the perception of threat, especially from foreign sources, but also from domestic “traitors.”

The last of eight conclusions in the book begins, “If you want a revolution, beware of how it might turn out, because you might one day rue the one you get.” Could you explain a little?听

D.C.: In retrospect many of those who pushed for the Iranian Revolution, especially听among the young in the rising middle class, now realize that bad as the Shah was, what they got was far bloodier and in every respect worse for Iran.

The same has been true in far too many cases. Once you unleash the forces of revolution, you make it possible for extremists听of the right or left to take power, and their remedies most often turn into something worse than the original disease. That is not the case with gradual reform.

The conservatives who put Hitler in power wanted to make Germany stronger, to curb the left, and to take back some of the cultural changes that had occurred in the 1920s (emancipation of women, loss of status for the old aristocracy, and others). What they got was a much greater change that led to mass murder on an unparalleled scale, a terrible war, and utter ruin. Had they known this ahead of time they certainly would never have turned to Hitler.

You quote Italian author saying, “If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.” That’s intriguing 鈥� what does he mean?

D.C.: It is impossible to maintain any society as it was. To preserve what is most worthwhile from the past, or in this Lampedusa novel the position of a once powerful noble family whose fortunes are fading, it is necessary to adapt. So, for example, had King Louis XVI accepted change more gracefully he would have become a constitutional monarch with significant but limited power.

More recently, had the Shah of Iran accepted liberal reformers into power and made necessary reforms he would have听kept his throne and Iran would be far better off than it is. In Algeria today the old military clique running things is refusing necessary political and economic change, and it is going to end badly.

In fact, in the U.S. we have not been properly addressing the need to adapt to significant changes. The list of issues that remain frozen 鈥� from making health care more affordable and equitable, to the general rise in inequality, continuing racism, climate change, demographic decline, the cost of housing in our richest and most dynamic urban areas, the drastic changes in employment patterns, etc. 鈥� have caused increasing discontent. But the rising populism almost totally fails to address any of these problems successfully.

So, we are not as far from having a truly destabilizing political upheaval as most of us think. Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, in contrast, did change things enough to preserve American democracy and capitalism, though those changes were fiercely resisted by Republicans at the time.听

For more information, contact Chirot at chirot@uw.edu.

91探花Notebook is a section of the 91探花News site dedicated to telling stories of the good work done by faculty and staff at the 91探花. Read all posts here.

Pam Schreiber, HFS director, named to housing association executive board

, who is executive director of 91探花Housing & Food Services and assistant vice president in the 91探花Office of Student Life, has a new role as well 鈥� she has been elected vice president to the executive board of the .

The executive board sets policy for the association 鈥� which is called ACUHO-I for short 鈥� and makes sure there are resources to serve the needs of its 17,000-some members, which represent 1.2 million on-campus students worldwide. Schreiber will be the board鈥檚 vice president in 2020, then serve a year as president-elect, and then a year as president.

Schreiber said as a board leader she 鈥渨ill focus on developing relationships grounded in trust and respect, and will practice listening carefully, especially to voices that have historically been silenced.”

She wrote in nomination documents for the position that her work in campus housing connects back to her own 鈥渢ransformational鈥� on-campus experience as a first-generation college student.

“My commitment to the field is unwavering,鈥� she wrote, “and I believe that transforming students鈥� lives remains our primary purpose.”

Schreiber joined the 91探花in 2009, from Florida Gulf Coast University.

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Dan Chirot of Jackson School, sociology receives honorary doctorate from University of Bucharest

, 91探花professor in the Jackson School of International Studies, will receive an honorary doctorate from the University of Bucharest, in Romania, for scholarship on that country and the Balkans.

He was given the honor in a ceremony on Oct. 10, during a three-day conference on “Thirty Years After: Post Communism, Democracy, and Illiberalism,” for which Chirot will be a keynote speaker. The title of his keynote talk will be “The Fall, Rise, and Decline of Democracy in Europe and the World.”

Chirot also will give a talk upon receiving the honorary degree 鈥� addressing an all-Romanian audience, which will be titled “Why 20th Century Romanian Sociology and History Are Relevant Today.”

Chirot, who is the Herbert J. Ellison Professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies, is also a professor of sociology. He founded the journal East European Politics and Societies and is the author of several books since his first, , was published in 1976. His next book will be “,” coming in 2020 from Princeton University Press.

, Jackson School director, said, “This is a wonderful and most appropriate recognition of Dan鈥檚 seminal work on Romania and the Balkans that date back to his graduate school days.”

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William Catterall named among inaugural fellows of pharmacology society

The has named , professor of pharmacology in the 91探花School of Medicine, a member of its inaugural class of fellows, established this year, honoring its most distinguished members.

The society, called ASPET for short, has 5,000 members worldwide who conduct pharmacological research and work for academia, government or industry; these include neuroscientists, toxicologists, chemical biologists, cardiovascular scientists, pharmacists and more.

Selection as a fellow, the society鈥檚 website states, goes to members who have demonstrated excellence in their contributions to 鈥渁dvance pharmacology, through their scientific achievements, mentorship and service to the society.”

Twenty-two individuals were named fellows for 2019, and will be recognized at the society鈥檚 business meetings and noted in the society鈥檚 quarterly publication, “” magazine.

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Information School鈥檚 Jacob O. Wobbrock, student co-authors, honored for paper

A paper by , professor in the 91探花Information School, and a team of undergraduate researchers has won the Douglas Engelbart Award for Best Paper at , an annual conference of the .

Wobbrock collaborated with a team of undergraduate students on the paper “.” The paper was selected from 102 submissions in all, 30 of which were accepted for the conference.

Co-authoring the paper were Anya Hsu, and Michael Magee of the iSchool and Marijn Burger of 91探花Bothell, all of whom have since graduated. The paper, Wobbrock said, showed that “the perceived credibility of online news pages is significantly affected by visual design elements even apart from actual content, which has implications for consumers and purveyors of real and fake news.” The conference was held Sept. 17 to 20, in Hof, Germany.

91探花Notebook is a section of the 91探花News site dedicated to telling stories of the good work done by faculty and staff at the 91探花. Read all posts here.

Faculty with the 91探花 will explore the impact of the 2016 election on their respective areas of expertise in a weekly lecture class for students titled “Trump in the World: International Implications of the Trump Presidency.”

Each week, faculty members will explore perspectives from Europe, Asia, Mexico and Russia as well as questions of human rights, international cooperation and migration.

“Two months in, it is clear that Trump administration represents a radical departure in how the United States approaches foreign policy. Given the size and the power of the U.S., these changes are having significant effects in the lives of the people all around the world,” said Jackson School Director , whose May 10 lecture will be on Turkey and the Middle East, and who will conclude the series with a final discussion on May 31.

“In this lecture series the Jackson School faculty will provide a historical context to the rise of 听Trump and discuss听how the Trump administration is altering 听global priorities and affecting different parts of the world. ”

The lectures will be held from 4:30 to 6 p.m. Wednesdays in Room 110 of Kane Hall.

The schedule is as follows:

March 29: The Global Context, with , professor of international studies.

April 5: Authoritarian Trends from the Past to the Present, with , associate professor of international studies and history.

April 12: Asia, with , professor of international studies.

April 19: Mexico, with , assistant professor of international studies.

April 26: Europe, with visiting EU Fellow and , associate professor of international studies.

May 3: Russia, with , associate professor of international studies.

May 10: Human Rights in Latin America, with , professor of international studies.

May 17: Turkey and the Middle East, with Re艧at Kasaba, professor and Jackson School director.

May 24: Migration, with , associate professor of international studies.

May 31: Final discussion, with Kasaba.

Two credits are available for students who register and attend regularly.

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For more information or to arrange interviews, contact Monique Thormann, Jackson School director of communications, at 206-685-0578 or thormm@uw.edu.

The concepts of freedom, equality, evolution and democracy lie at the heart of “.” The new book, published in May by Princeton University Press, is by and , faculty members in the 91探花 .

How did this book come to be, and how did you two come to take it on together?

S.M.: The notion emerged from discussions we were having over lunch or dinner about the battles in Congress, fundamentalist religion, major conflicts of the last century, and so on.

It became clear to us that ideas were central in each of these contexts 鈥� ideas about the role of government and the free market, about the nature and order of the world, about the reasons that drove leaders like Hitler, Stalin and Mao to do what they did, affecting the lives of hundreds of millions.

Moreover, most of these ideas weren’t new, though they had been altered from their original expression, adapted to later contexts. So it seemed to us a book exploring these insights would be a good thing to do.

You write that you intend in this book “to pursue a different type of intellectual history 鈥� to show that ideas have been among the primary forces behind modern history during the past three centuries.” How did you present this argument to the reader?

S.M.: Our approach is simple and direct. We chose to write about ideas that have been particularly influential on how people have understood the political, economic, religious and scientific dimensions to modern existence.

The book has two main parts. In part one, we examine the ideas of , , and also and . These are ideas related to freedom, equality, democracy and a secular, evolving universe, all of which have become fully global today.

Nonetheless, the thought of these individuals can be tied to certain parts of the . In the first three cases, they appeared in specific writings, such as Smith’s “” and Darwin’s “.” These are books that have had immense influence and should be studied by every university student, no matter their major. We thus look at these texts in detail, as well as their historical-intellectual roots. We then trace the evolution of their expanding impact down to the present.

In part two of the book, we shift to the major reactions that have played out against the four domains noted above. Such reactions took many forms, leading to much violence in word and deed. To a large degree, they culminated in such authoritarian systems as fascism, Soviet and Maoist communism, and religious fundamentalism in both Islam and Christianity. We borrowed a term from philosopher and called them, collectively, the . But we make clear, too, that they have their own origin in the more intolerant side of Enlightenment thinking itself.

All of this allows us to make some powerful statements about how large portions of modern history, again not only in the West but globally, are the result of people acting in the name of ideas and arguments that are no less present and powerful today.

Among your conclusions you state, “The humanities, we believe, should expand their subject matter to include major political thinkers in all fields. This means analyzing the philosophical, political and social ideas of economists, scientists, even mathematicians, not just of philosophers, authors, artists and social theorists” globally. What would be the results of such a change in higher education, and in student education?

S.M.: At the most basic level, it would provide students with a much better intellectual understanding of the world, as it really is. How can we comprehend a reality like our hostile, gridlocked Congress, the reasons for the recent global economic crisis, or a phenomenon like ISIS, without looking into the ideas that are driving forces behind them?

That Congress has been, in an important measure, replaying a struggle for the idea of “America” itself first bitterly fought between Jefferson and Hamilton can tell us a great deal. That ideas derived from Adam Smith had a direct role in decisions that helped lead to the financial crisis is well known only by some. And it is impossible to understand the actions of ISIS without knowledge of what is motivating them 鈥� knowledge that would also reveal the futility of trying to defeat the threat with military power alone.

In short, there is no substitute for the study, analysis and critical evaluation of ideas. This is especially true for those ideas that continue to have great influence and that are involved in how leaders, groups, organizations and nations behave.

Speaking generally, what would you like readers to take away from this book?

D.C.: Ideas are not just important, but vital. If we fail to understand what ideas govern the modern world, and where they came from, we cannot understand what is going on anywhere. The European Enlightenment, which began as a set of ideas that were anything but widely accepted, eventually triumphed and transformed first the West and then the entire world.

If we don’t educate our college and university students to understand how all this happened, they enter the wider world filled with uninformed prejudices and assumptions whose origins and consequences they barely understand. This not only makes them less able citizens, but also deprives them of necessary guidance in their own political and professional lives. Of course, even those who have long graduated from college, including our elected officials, could profit from such understanding, too.

• For more information about “The Shape of the New,” contact Montgomery at scottlm@uw.edu or Chirot at chirot@uw.edu.