Presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump enter Election Day and facing tight battles in the swing states.

Millions of people have already voted early, but the remainder of Americans will cast their votes on Tuesday. Before the results start rolling in, 91探花News asked three 91探花 professors of political science to discuss what鈥檚 on their minds heading into the general election鈥檚 final hours.

, professor of political science

I’m looking at two specific predictions. The first is whether one candidate has (more or less) a clean sweep of the swing states or whether they (more or less) tie and divide the electoral college votes from the swing states. The swing state polling is effectively tied, suggesting that the latter scenario is more likely. But what if the polling is systematically overestimating or underestimating one candidate鈥檚 popularity? I suspect this is the case, and that either Harris or Trump will sweep the swing states.

If I’m right, the second prediction involves: Which candidate will sweep? I suspect it is more likely that Harris would be the candidate to sweep over Trump. There is a lot of different types of evidence out there showing the polls are likely underestimating her support or over-estimating Trump’s. There is no evidence to suggest that the polls are underestimating Trump’s support or overestimating hers 鈥� but of course, they could be, and this is all reading tea leaves. I wouldn’t be that surprised if the swing states are more divided, and there is still the possibility that Trump could sweep them.

We will get lots of vote counts in by Tuesday night from Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia, which will help us to see some trends.

, professor of political science

Like everybody else who feeds on the听IV drip known as the presidential election’s horse race coverage, I will be monitoring Pennsylvania 鈥� the swingiest of swing states.

I will be looking for any evidence that Trump’s attempts to mobilize young men without college degrees by blitzing non-traditional media such as podcasts and securing endorsements from figures like Elon Musk made a big impact. I will also be watching to see whether turnout on the Republican side is influenced by President Biden’s off-the-cuff remarks about Trump’s supporters being garbage, whether he intended to say that or not.

I will also be looking for any evidence that Vice President Harris’s efforts to mobilize women around abortion and reproductive rights and against Trump’s misogynistic听language and behavior made a huge impact. Similarly, whether her overtures to suburban Republican women and Independents听with the aid of surrogates like Liz Cheney helped her cause.

There are other hypotheses that are up for testing:

Is the great re-sorting of the parties along educational lines 鈥� and cutting across other cleavages such as race, ethnicity and region 鈥� the big thing some analysts think it is? Will immigration really drive voters to the polls, particularly to vote for Trump in large听numbers?

Will voters’ memory of 20% cumulative inflation since 2021, sky-high housing prices and relatively high interest rates be as salient as some analysts believe? Or will more recent trends of enduring economic strength and a soft landing stop the momentum toward Trump on the economy?

Finally, if Harris wins, is it because she executed an incredibly difficult feat with exceeding discipline? Did she successfully manage to reinvent her image in a few short months, credibly transforming into a centrist security hawk who prizes unity and bipartisanship despite significant听baggage from her 2019 Democratic presidential primary flameout? In other words, was she able to shed her image as a hyper-progressive Bay Area liberal and come across as a unifier who appeals to folks across the political spectrum? If she wins, I am going to be looking for data that supports this thesis, because it will say a lot about American politics and the parties going forward.

, teaching professor of political science

This election presents difficult circumstances for the Democratic Party. In other elections across western democracies, incumbent governments have been defeated badly by voters angry about inflation and the other dislocations of the pandemic. The American election being a coin flip suggests that some different issues might be in play in the American context.

搁别肠别苍迟,听suggesting that Iowa 鈥� a state Trump easily carried in 2016 and 2020 鈥� is close because of a major shift among women voters. This suggests that the overturning of Roe v. Wade because of former President Trump’s three nominations to the Supreme Court is making the election more competitive.

The decision of Iowa Republicans to pass a near-total abortion ban in a pro-choice state is the obvious explanation, and the abortion issue is one obvious reason that the outcome of the听election is so uncertain.

For more information or to reach one of the faculty members, contact Lauren Kirschman at lkirsc@uw.edu.

With the presidential election just weeks away, American political divides have once again taken center stage. While this chasm is most often attributed to disagreements on social issues, a new book argues otherwise.

鈥溾�� focuses on how former President Donald Trump 鈥� like other populists that came before him 鈥� exploits what the authors call 鈥榠nnovation inequality鈥�. Trump has been successful, they argue, because Americans are split between highly innovative and less innovative regions, or because of the gap between areas that are more technologically advanced and those that aren鈥檛. The book analyzes the origins and political implications of these divides.

Written by and , the book forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. Menaldo is a 91探花 professor of political science while Wittstock received his doctorate in political science from the 91探花this year.

91探花News spoke with Menaldo to discuss his book, the upcoming election and Trump鈥檚 campaigns in 2016 and 2020.

What made you want to write a book on this topic?

Victor Menaldo: There were three motivations. The first is that I was not satisfied with the conventional explanations for why former President Donald Trump won in 2016 and lost in 2020. The second motivation is that all the explanations focused on Trump as an individual instead of a larger phenomenon 鈥� some people call it populism, but there are other names for it. If it wasn鈥檛 Trump, it would have been someone else. Third, I felt that the approaches I鈥檇 seen to explaining Trump鈥檚 success and then his failure were not very historic. There are instances of populism in the past that could shed light on this. It鈥檚 not just a recent thing.

People offer many different explanations for America鈥檚 political divides, but you write in the book that America is actually divided along economic lines. Can you explain this concept?

VM: There has always been a difference between less innovative and more innovative places. The more innovative places are areas like Silicon Valley or the North Carolina Research Triangle. These places are very technologically advanced in terms of clusters of universities, companies and other organizations that are really on the cutting edge of research and development and innovation. But these differences have always been a thing, since the very beginning of the republic. Right after colonialism, Boston, Philadelphia and New York City were like the Silicon Valleys of their day. That’s where a lot of the innovations around industrialization took place. But even though other places in the vicinity weren鈥檛 as technologically advanced, the gap between them in terms of their contributions to innovation and the country鈥檚 economic dynamism wasn鈥檛 as wide as it is today.

There have been populist movements throughout our history that nonetheless exploited that divide. For example, we talk in the book about , who was a populist at the turn of the 20th century. He was nominated three times by the Democratic Party and lost all three times. If you think about Bryan, a lot of that political movement was about how agriculture had been left behind by industrialization or rural areas had been forgotten. He didn鈥檛 make it explicit, but that was about the technology divide or what we call 鈥渋nnovation inequality鈥� in the book. Technological change was embedded in industrialization and some manufacturing centers got ahead while many rural areas fell behind.

What we think explains Trump phenomenon is that there’s been much more of a polarization economically between high-tech places, those that make big contributions to the globalized knowledge economy, and places that are more peripheral. It鈥檚 like comparing Silicon Valley to the agricultural regions of the Central Valley in California. There is just a very stark difference. It gets expressed socially or culturally as well, but the underlying roots are the economic and technological divide in terms of places鈥� differing contributions to innovation or cutting-edge industries.

What analysis do you offer in the book of Trump鈥檚 win in 2016 and loss in 2020?

VM: For 2016, we write about two sides. There is the negative side, where Trump was very antagonistic toward big tech, universities and the highly educated, skilled labor forces that are integral to those industries. One example is he spoke out against visas for skilled immigrants, so he burned bridges quickly with a lot of tech firms, tech workers and highly educated skilled workers in technologically advanced industries.

Then there is the other side of it. It鈥檚 not just aggravating the tech industry, it鈥檚 also appealing to folks that are not part of the knowledge economy by talking about things like coal, energy jobs, manufacturing or agriculture: industries that have probably not benefited as much from technological change. He鈥檚 speaking against big tech and appealing directly to folks who are not involved in those industries who might feel they were left behind.

What we find in 2020 is places that flipped from Trump to Biden were more technologically advanced areas 鈥� key counties that flipped in North Carolina, Georgia and Arizona became more technologically advanced in terms of their integration to the global knowledge economy in the previous four years.

What stands out to you about this election cycle?

VM: In some senses, Republicans have narrowed the gulf with tech firms. Not all of them, but some, such as Elon Musk鈥檚 alliance with Trump or venture capitalists who disagree with President Joe Biden鈥檚 policies. This polarization has also been reduced in some ways by Trump and vice-presidential candidate JD Vance speaking to select tech firms or sectors such as cryptocurrency. It鈥檚 almost like they read our book and were like, 鈥淥h, maybe we can co-opt some of these folks.鈥�

On the other hand, I do think presidential nominee Kamala Harris鈥� policies are very much in line with President Biden鈥檚 and Hillary Clinton鈥檚 policies regarding technology and are part in parcel of a now decades long 鈥溾�� transition: pro-high-skilled labor, pro-high-skilled immigration, pro-education, a lot of investment in green energy and so on. The Democratic Party hasn’t really changed all that much, as much as they鈥檇 like to appeal to their older blue-collar roots. But the one place they have changed, or at least returned to these roots, I think since President Biden, is being pro-technology but also pro-manufacturing in ways they were forced to by Trump. For example, a lot of the is focused on building semiconductor plants in the U.S. I think Biden was reacting to Trump鈥檚 appeal in the blue wall states like Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania.

So, what I see in this election is lessons learned by both parties. Trump learned that he can鈥檛 alienate all of tech. The Democratic side is saying they can be pro-Silicon Valley and innovation while also splitting the difference and talking about bringing back manufacturing jobs to the Rust Belt. In fact, at least in this regard the parties are less polarized than they were in either 2016 or 2020.

For more information, contact Menaldo at vmenaldo@uw.edu

91探花 political scientists and have spoken and written extensively about politics in emerging democracies and 鈥� usually those other than the United States 鈥� check the power of their leaders, present and past.

Former President Donald Trump鈥檚 recent indictment poses existential challenges for an otherwise mature democracy like the United States: What are citizens willing to accept from their presidents, even once they鈥檙e out of office?

Menaldo and Long, both faculty in the 91探花Department of Political Science and co-founders of the , talked with 91探花News about how they frame these issues not only for the media and the general public, but also for their students. The conversation was edited for clarity.

听

Q: Watergate and President Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon have come up often in discussions of the Trump case. Does it make sense to compare them?

James Long: Regardless of what you think of Ford’s pardon, Nixon paid a price for his misdeeds: He had to resign and left office in disgrace, even if he was not then criminally prosecuted. At this point, Trump has not yet faced accountability, assuming he’s guilty at all, and in fact he could be rewarded through reelection, which was never possible for Nixon.

Then there鈥檚 a broader point on how you want to treat presidents when they’re in office or after. Pundits and lawyers say every citizen is equal under the eyes of the law. That may be true in principle, but at the same time a president is not like everybody else 鈥� they have certain duties to uphold. That doesn鈥檛 mean presidents should commit corrupt or criminal acts, but it does mean that they perform a different function than all other citizens.

We’ve put members of Congress, governors, city council members and all manner of politicians in jail. When people have been really concerned about a president’s actions and their legality, we have basically decided as a country, until now, that it’s not worth it: Reagan and George H.W. Bush on Iran-Contra; Bill Clinton and 鈥淟ewinsky-gate鈥�; George W. Bush for conduct in the war on terror. If what you care about is moving on, then you excuse the misdeeds, even possible crimes. You just hope that the person retires and you try to move on. The problem with Trump is that he wants to be president again.

Bad behavior on the part of previous presidents — when it鈥檚 been known 鈥� folks have decided to let it go in some broad sense. Now that’s changing. I think we’ve set a new precedent with Trump, and we have no idea what that means in the future.

听

Q: You鈥檝e written about other countries鈥� experiences, including those that have prosecuted leaders aggressively and those that have avoided it for various reasons. What are the issues that arise?

Victor Menaldo: Presidents are political animals by nature. They are called on to do things that are always potentially at the margin of illegality, especially around foreign policy, because in Jack Nicholson鈥檚 famous words: 鈥淎mericans simply can鈥檛 handle the truth.鈥� If you put presidents under a microscope, you will always find some basis for some kind of accusation.

So in response, there are two extremes: One is to put the microscope away and look the other way. The problem there is you incentivize bad behavior and end up with impunity. The second is to always use that microscope and magnify every little thing they do and encourage prosecutors to go after them with abandon. But if there鈥檚 an investigation every single time there is even the smallest iota of wrongdoing, then that’s going to create perverse consequences: A president will anticipate it, so they’re going to use their power to ward off prosecution or to stay in office so that they don’t see the jailhouse.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is a good example. He was once a staunch defender of the judicial branch in Israel 鈥� a rather vanilla type of conservative. But when he started to get in legal trouble, especially in 2019 when he was sitting prime minister and indicted for fraud and bribery, he became more of a populist who attacked the other branches of government. He tried to get his supporters to help him legally by delegitimizing Israel’s democratic institutions, especially courts. In fact, he’s trying to do that now that he’s returned to power, and he鈥檚 mastered how to peddle conspiracy theories and radicalize and polarize the country to try to take the legal heat off.

The U.S. might start to look more like an Israel, Peru or Brazil, where it’s politically difficult not to go after leaders, and so both political parties may magnify that microscope and hyper-scrutinize everything leaders do. Then leaders may be tempted, like Netanyahu and Trump toward the end of his time in office, to undermine institutions and laws that threaten their freedom. This has been a recipe for eroding democracy, such as in Bolivia during Evo Morales鈥� presidency.

Q: How do you incorporate Trump in your teaching?

VM: Trump鈥檚 case has allowed me to focus on two tools democracy provides to uphold the rule of law and make sure politicians behave well. One involves how you sanction them and the other involves the leaders you select in the first place. The latter is usually more powerful because if democracy is constructed well, you’ll select the right type of leaders who don’t want to misbehave, whose strategy is to please the people in ways that are legal, and that strive to improve life for the majority of citizens, to leave the country better than they found it.

I think Trump showcases the failure of this screening tool. It’s not about electing angels but about selecting politicians who at least want to do right, even if it’s for self-interested reasons, such as improving their popularity or burnishing their legacy. It鈥檚 about rejecting leaders who aren’t going to press every advantage, look for every opportunity to politicize the law or cripple their opponents, or undermine institutions, to gain short-run advantages.

We have taken for granted in this country how much we rely on the screening tool so we can avoid turning to the sanctioning one. If you select bad leaders, then you are in trouble, because prosecutors may be beholden to them or, if they are not, a politician鈥檚 supporters are going to try to discredit attempts to hold them accountable. Good screening therefore beats imperfect punishment, and Trump makes it easier to teach this lesson.

JL: The interesting thing to teach about Trump to undergrads in my current class on global crime and corruption is not only about Trump, but about the American presidency: the two things that the framers of the Constitution thought about and in part, but only in part, gave us solutions to.

The framers were mindful of the fact that you can’t just take whatever criminal statute you have and always apply that to the president. You have to allow the president broader powers, and you also have to allow the fact that they may do something that’s not technically illegal but which is unbecoming of the office of the presidency and undermines their constitutional discharge. Therefore they should be removed from office in a way that is different than how a person may be thrown in jail if found guilty of a crime. So they wrote 鈥渉igh crimes and misdemeanors鈥� in the constitution as an impeachable offense, which any impeachment article would have to define.

Secondly, they gave Congress this duty. They understood the balance of power would constrain the executive. They saw what Oliver Cromwell had done in the brief period when England didn鈥檛 have a monarch and they had their own revolution against King George. So they were fearful of a lawless executive and so part of Congress’ job is to limit presidential abuse of office.

But something the framers worried about but didn鈥檛 have a great solution to was how to avoid partisan interests in Congress that could undermine its impeachment powers. If people care more about being Democrats and Republicans than they do about asserting Congress鈥� role to stop an unruly president, or avoid overzealous and frivolous investigations, then the fact that this is Congress’ Constitutional prerogative doesn’t matter.

One thing the framers wouldn鈥檛 have anticipated is that the executive branch has essentially declared itself above the law. During the Nixon Administration, the Justice Department鈥檚 Office of Legal Counsel’s decision said that no sitting president can be criminally charged. This was upheld during the Clinton administration and formed the basis of Robert Mueller鈥檚 鈥渄eclination鈥� to prosecute Trump. To be clear, this is the executive branch, under the DOJ, providing legal and political cover to the head of that branch, the president, to do whatever they want. That鈥檚 the standard that we have right now 鈥� although the OLC opinion has not been tested in court, it throws the matter of a lawless president back to Congress.

Although Nixon never went through the impeachment process, it’s well documented that he resigned when Republican senators came to him and said he would not have the votes to survive conviction; and what about congressional Democrats and Republicans during Clinton鈥檚 impeachment and Senate trial, and both of Trump鈥檚? Are these all examples of Congress performing the function the framers invested them with, shirking responsibility or something else entirely?

For my students, thinking about dilemmas the framers considered and the solutions they provided, but also how in various ways those solutions have been perhaps undermined, is profoundly fascinating and interesting.

Recent notable books by 91探花 faculty members study politics and culture in post-World War II Japan, explore regime change, nonprofit management, documents from the ancient world and more.

‘Japan in the American Century” explores postwar relations, current geopolitical changes

After the United States ended World War II by dropping atomic weapons on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it then conducted “the most intrusive international reconstruction of another nation in modern history,” according to a new book by , professor emeritus at the UW’s . Only now, amid geopolitical changes of the 21^st century, is Japan pulling free from American dominance and constraints placed on it after the war.

“,” published this month by Harvard University Press, examines how Japan, with its conservative heritage, responded to the imposition of a new liberal order. The book offers a thoughtful history of the now-changing relationship between the two nations.

“The price Japan paid to end the occupation was a Cold War alliance with the United States that ensured America鈥檚 dominance in the region,” Pyle writes. “Still traumatized by its wartime experience, Japan developed a grand strategy of dependence on U.S. security guarantees so that the nation could concentrate on economic growth.” Meanwhile, he adds, Japan “reworked the American reforms” to fit its own cultural and economic circumstances and social institutions.

Today that postwar world is in retreat, Pyle argues, and Japan is changing its foreign policy, “returning to an activist, independent role in global politics not seen since 1945” 鈥� and that has repercussion for its continuing relations with the U.S. and its role in Asian geopolitics.

The book distills a lifetime of work on Japan and the U.S. by Pyle, a former director of the Jackson School, who joined the 91探花in 1964. “The American Century,” referring to global political, economic and cultural dominance by the United States, is a term famously coined by , publisher of , Time and Fortune magazines, in a Life editorial in 1941.

To learn more, contact kbp@uw.edu.

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When authoritarianism becomes democracy: New boss, same as the old boss?

When authoritarian governments transition to democracy, sometimes those running the old system are the ones creating the new system 鈥� and design it to their own advantage. So argues 91探花political scientist , co-author of the book “,” published this summer by Cambridge University Press. He wrote the book with of the University of Chicago.

“We examine 鈥� how does this process occur and what are the consequences?” Menaldo, associate professor of political science, said in an posted on the Political Science Department website. “Since World War 2, the outgoing authoritarian regime has drafted the new democratic constitution in over two-thirds of the countries that have made this transition.” Menaldo and Albertus studied such transitions globally across two centuries.

“There are many ways [for outgoing regimes] to do this,” Menaldo said. “One is to require a supermajority for future amendments to the constitution they have written. Others include barriers to voting, malapportionment, and giving veto power to unelected political bodies in which elites from the old guard are over-represented.”

Some of this may have a familiar ring to those interested in American history. Though the book is not about the United States, Menaldo said, the findings are consistent with a longstanding argument about the U.S. Constitution and its authors 鈥� that they were a small elite group who in writing the document partly protected their own interests.

“The United States continues to hold indirect elections for the presidency, and its federal system long protected subnational enclaves in which a majority of citizens in some states were deprived of basic rights,” Menaldo said.

To learn more, contact Menaldo at vmenaldo@uw.edu.

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Principles, practices of American Indian business

American Indian business is booming overall in recent years, but not thriving as much on reservations, notes a new book co-edited by , associate professor in the 91探花Bothell School of Business titled “.”

Despite healthy growth in American Indian and Alaska Native-owned businesses, they are largely absent from reservations “and Native Americans own private businesses at the lowest rate per capita for any ethnic or racial group in the United States,” say notes from the publisher, 91探花 Press.

“Many Indigenous entrepreneurs face unique cultural and practical challenges in starting, locating, and operating a business, from a perceived lack of a culture of entrepreneurship and a suspicion of capitalism to the difficulty of borrowing startup funds when real estate is held in trust and cannot be used as collateral.”

The book discusses the history and state of such businesses as well as business practices and education. It ranges “from early trading posts to today’s casino boom.”

A review in praised the book as “so well done that it can be used by higher education institutions to acquaint students on how to better understand doing business in Indian Country.”

Kennedy, a member of the Cherokee Nation, edited the book with Charles F. Harrington of the University of South Carolina-Upstate, Amy Klemm Verbos of the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, Daniel Stewart of Gonzaga University, Joseph Scott-Gladstone of the University of New Haven and Gavin Clarkson of New Mexico State University.

To learn more, contact Kennedy at 425-352-5321 or deannak@uw.edu.

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Evans School’s Mary Kay Gugerty honored for book on nonprofits management, ‘The Goldilocks Challenge’

,听 professor in the Evans School of Public Policy & Governance, has been announced the recipient of the from the for her book, “ The book, which Gugerty wrote with of Northwestern University, was published this year by Oxford University Press.

The award “highlights the very best thinking in management, governance and capacity-building, and helps expose practitioners to new knowledge and approaches in the field,” according to the group’s website. Gugerty is the Nancy Bell Evans Professor of Nonprofit Management in the Evans School, and faculty director of the .

The book is about “measuring impact,” a statement from the reviewing committee says. “We all want to do it, know we have to do it 鈥� and are all too often frustrated by one-size-fits-all expectations of how to do it. ‘The Goldilocks Challenge’ offers a solution: an impact measurement framework that helps organizations decide what elements they should monitor and measure.” That framework is based on having data that is at once credible, actionable, responsible and transportable.

To learn more, contact Gugerty at 206-221-4599 or gugerty@uw.edu.

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Rethinking post-World War II art, politics in Japan

In a new cultural history of post-World War II Japan, , 91探花associate professor of Asian languages and literature, explores art and politics 鈥� and consolidations of political and cultural life 鈥� in the years leading to the Cold War. His new book “,” was published in September by Cornell University Press.

Jesty focuses on social realists on the radical left who, “hoped to wed their art with anti-capitalist and anti-war activism, a liberal art education movement whose focus on the child inspired innovation in documentary film, and a regional avant-garde group split between ambition and local loyalty.”

The book, Jesty writes, has the two main goals, the first being to reframe that history and its relevance to the present. The second is to show a way of studying the relationship between art and politics that views art as a mode of intervention “but insists artistic intervention move beyond the idea that the artwork of artist unilaterally authors political significance, to trace how creations and expressive acts may (or may not) actually engage the terms of shared meaning and value.”

To learn more, contact Jesty at jestyj@uw.edu or visit his .

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Exploring India’s ‘political economy of electricity’

Electricity is critical to India’s continued growth and economic health, but despite decades of reform the country remains unable to provide high-quality and affordable energy for all. A new book co-edited by , an associate professor in the Jackson School, explores these issues. “” was published earlier this year by Oxford University Press.

The book tracks power sectors in 15 states in India, giving an analysis of their political economy of electricity. A historically grounded study of the country’s political economy, the book suggests, helps better understand the past and inform new reforms to “improve sectoral outcomes and generate political rewards.”

Kale’s co-editors were Navroz K. Dubash of India’s Centre for Policy Research and Ranjit Bharvirkar of the Regulatory Assistance Project, a multinational nonprofit organization. Kale is also director of the Jackson School’s South Asia Center and chair of its South Asia Studies Program.

To learn more, contact Kale at 206-221-4852 or kale@uw.edu

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Book chapter by Rajesh Rao offers new view of ancient Indus script

, 91探花professor in the , has written an article about the that will appear in the book “.” The Indus script, also known as the Harappan script, is one of the last major undeciphered scripts of the ancient world. The article can be downloaded .

The book celebrates the contributions to South Asian archaeology of , professor of anthropology at the University of Wisconsin. Rao’s article, focusing on a set of miniature tablets discovered by Kenoyer in 1997, sets forth the “potentially provocative” conclusion that such stamps may have been used as a sort of currency in a barter-based economy.

“Walking with the Unicorn” will be published Oct. 30 by . Rao’s earlier work on the Indus script was described in 91探花News articles in and of 2009. Rao is the of computer science and engineering and electrical engineering.

To learn more, contact Rao at rao@cs.washington.edu.

A “resource curse” is the idea that countries with lots of nonrenewable natural resources such as hydrocarbons and minerals historically tend to be burdened with corrupt governments and underdeveloped economies. Wikipedia also calls it “.”

A new book by , 91探花associate professor of political science, takes a different view, as its title suggests. “” argues that institutions formed early in a resource-rich country, before they ever discover oil or minerals, can inhibit economic development and the formation of effective government.

“Institutions and problems inherited by developing countries from their recent and long-ago past 鈥� including geographic adversity and colonial legacies 鈥� have pushed these countries to cultivate their natural resource sectors,” Menaldo said. “This often becomes their default economic and fiscal strategy.”

These inherited institutions and problems “make it impossible” for such countries to build modern, diversified economies based on sound law, innovation and educated workforces, he said: “Therefore, these bad institutions and associated dysfunctions are both the cause of the presence of an intensive natural resource sector and the cause of their political and economic underdevelopment.”

A reviewer in the wrote: “Menaldo maintains that resources discoveries don’t lead to bad institutions. Instead, institutional badness leads to resources discoveries.”

Menaldo added, “Indeed, dysfunctional state institutions are what gives developing countries an edge over stable, developed countries in the resource development game. Weak governments are wont to give foreign oil companies costly concessions to support oil and mineral discoveries.”

He said the book also demonstrates that, despite being “cursed” by their institutions, “developing countries are blessed by their natural resources. Oil and minerals can play an integral role in stimulating state capacity, capitalism, industrialization, and democracy 鈥� even if resources are themselves a symptom of underdevelopment.”

Menaldo said this could apply to such countries as Congo, Angola, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela and Russia.

“The Institutions Curse” was published in September by Cambridge University Press.

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For more information, contact Menaldo at vmenaldo@uw.edu.